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Privacy-Aware Cloud Auditing for GDPR Compliance
Verification in Online Healthcare
Masoud Barati, Gagangeet Singh Aujla, Senior Member, IEEE , Jose Tomas Llanos, Kwabena Adu Duodu,
Omer Rana, Member, IEEE , Madeline Carr, Rajiv Ranjan, Senior Member, IEEE .
Abstract—Emerging multi-tenant cloud computing
ecosystems allow multiple applications to share virtu-
alised pool of computing and networking resources. As a
result such ecosystems are becoming increasingly prone
to data privacy concerns (personal data leakages and
unauthorised access). While cloud computing providers
support robust security and privacy mechanisms (e.g,
public key cryptography, firewalls, virtual private net-
works, among many others), they lack mechanisms and
frameworks to monitor, audit and verify these data pri-
vacy concerns. The emergence of data protection regula-
tions around the world, such as General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in Europe and the Data Protection
Act (DPA) in the UK, further emphasise the need to
overcome these privacy limitations. A novel technique for
monitoring, auditing and verifying the operations carried
out on a user’s personal data in cloud computing ecosys-
tems is proposed. Our research methodology leverages
distributed ledger technologies (e.g., Blockchain, Smart
Contracts) for developing an immutable recording tech-
nique, which transparently logs, monitors and verifies the
operations carried out on user data. Using a healthcare
pharmacy scenario and extensive real-world experiments,
we validate the feasibility of the proposed technique. The
proposed work handles a large pool of requests (> 13K)
ensuring minimal latency (≈50-60 ms) and overheads for
three different service packages varied with respect to the
number of actors and operations).
Index Terms—blockchain, container-based monitoring,
data privacy, healthcare, smart contracts
I. Introduction
CLoud-hosted applications which allow users to runsoftware through web browsers without the need to
install any specific software on their own devices are growing
in popularity. As a result, user (i.e. “data subjects” in
GDPR) data needs to be migrated to the cloud, a trend
that is unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future [2].
However, storage of user data coupled with the complexity of
multi-tenant cloud ecosystems, raises significant governance
and compliance concerns under the EU GDPR [3] and the
UK DPA, for example. GDPR and DPA compliance concerns
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serve as a barrier to migration to the cloud, especially for
small and medium scale companies, who rely more and more
on public cloud data-centres, for application hosting, to
benefit from economies of scale and on-demand provisioning
of hardware and software services. As a result, they are more
likely to “find it difficult to exercise the full control required
by data protection legislation on how the cloud data-centre
provider hosts the requested services” [1].
A. Research Problem
Cloud-hosted application solutions are typically “layered”,
involving a chain of cloud infrastructure (e.g., Amazon
Web Services, Microsoft Azure) and software providers (e.g.,
payment gateways and customer relationship management
services). In this architecture, it can be difficult for the
application providers, “data controller” (based on GDPR
terminology), to verify data handling practices of a cloud
providers, and thus to be certain that data is being handled
in a lawful manner. Similarly, due to a loss of governance
and control, a data controller may be incapable of providing
evidence of compliance with inter alia the data location
and transfer, “privacy-by-design” and accountability require-
ments laid down in GDPR (Arts. 44–47, 25 and 5(2)) [10].
On the other hand, users (i.e. “data subjects” in GDPR)
are seldom aware of the highly intricate and layered ar-
chitecture of cloud ecosystems [5]. They typically interact
only with a Web interface rather than the larger, composite
ecosystem of service providers, entrusting their personal
data and identity to the consumer-facing component with-
out realising that the cloud-based application may share
their data with several additional providers (e.g. online
advertising services and payment gateways). In this opaque
context, it is hard for data subjects to exert any control over
their personal data after the initial disclosure. Also, when
multiple infrastructure and software providers are involved
in a cloud-hosted application solution, the risk of personal
data being processed for additional purposes can be high [1].
Crucially, the lack of transparency that characterises cloud
ecosystems impede the data subject’s ability to give “in-
formed consent” to the use, sharing and repurposing of their
personal data. Users experience a lack of control over their
personal data, exacerbated by the growing number of data
breaches resulting from cyberattacks on cloud systems. This
threatens to undermine consumer trust and hinder the use
of infrastructure and software services offered by cloud.
1) Research Questions: To realise the full potential and
benefits of cloud computing, the data protection concerns
must be effectively addressed. To this end, cloud ecosystems
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should be both transparent and auditable. However, to
achieve this, we need to answer following research questions:
• how do we develop an approach that ensures that data
subjects and data controllers can verify who possess
their personal data and with whom it is/was shared?
• how to develop an approach that can transparently
record operations on personal data and support policies
to enable data subjects and data controllers to identify
and verify operations that are permissible on the data?
• how to develop an immutable recording mechanism to
log and verify the operations carried out on user data
based on the GDPR legislation?
B. Overview of Research Approach and Contributions
We develop a novel privacy-aware auditing approach
and related framework (see Fig. 1) consisting of following
novel features: As an automated approach is needed for
logging data operations in the cloud ecosystems, our ap-
proach includes a novel monitoring technique. To simplify
the portability of monitoring framework across multiple
cloud service providers that employ heterogeneous virtu-
alisation approaches, we leverage existing container-based
application-level virtualisation technologies, e.g., Docker, for
implementing the monitoring technique (see section IV-A).
We call this as user’s ”data container” in the remainder
of this paper. Along with monitoring feature, the user’s
”data container” also needs to have capability to record
the data operation while ensuring immutability. To this
end, we present a novel approach (see section IV-B) that
applies Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs), such as
Blockchain and smart contracts, to enable an immutable
audit (provenance) trail [11] and verification of GPDR com-
pliance on monitored data operations. This approach takes
into account of user preferences for verifying obligations and
access control policies. The key contributions of this work
include:
• an online pharmacy scenario to motivate how GDPR
requirements arise when combining a number of cloud-
hosted services;
• a data “container” (built on existing open source ap-
proaches) that can be migrated across cloud providers,
and used to record and monitor events/operations from
a provider (referred to as a “data controller” in GDPR);
• a model and related smart contracts for verifying GDPR
obligations taking account of user preferences – i.e. not
all user data may need to confirm to GDPR require-
ments.
• an implementation of smart contracts in a Blockchain
network, evaluated using a Blockchain test network.
Fig. 1: Overview of the research approach
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II describes state-of-the-art proposals associated with
data privacy & GDPR. Section III presents the online phar-
macy scenario used to contextualise this work. Section IV
presents design of the container-based architecture making
use of smart contracts. Section V describes experimental
results of our Blockchain-based technique, and finally Sec-
tion VI describes conclusions and lessons learned.
TABLE I: Comparison of existing monitoring tools
Monitoring tool Performance Compliance
CAdvisor X ×
CLAMS X ×




There are several monitoring tools and architectures (like,
CAdvisor1, CLAMS [27], Cloud Watch2, M2CPA [29], and
M3 [28]) that are deployed in the cloud ecosystem. But, these
monitoring tools either do not support compliance monitor-
ing or they are not compatible with container-based virtual-
isation. A comparative anlaysis of the exisiting monitoring
tools is presented in Table I. Hence, a novel monitoring
architecture is required that can monitor data operations
undertaken in the cloud ecosystem and later verify them
for GDPR compliance. In this regard, a novel architecture
compliance-aware cloud application engineering was pro-
posed in [30]. This proposal highlighted that blockchain or
DLTs can be very useful to design an end-to-end GDPR mon-
itoring, auditing and verification architecture for the privacy-
aware cloud services. A procedure for designing privacy-
aware cloud-based applications was described in [18] under
which applications are published through a GDPR compliant
software architecture using containers. The architecture,
however, does not use Blockchain technology for verifying
GDPR rules in an automatic way. In [17], a container-based
architecture was proposed to support real time identity and
provenance verification within cloud & edge computing. The
architecture uses a permissioned Blockchain to track actions
of devices/services on user data. The approach lacked a
monitoring strategy for GDPR compliance verification.
A Blockchain-based approach that improved data account-
ability and provenance tracking was proposed in [20]. The
approach used GDPR and proposed two models for running
enforced smart contracts: (i) user consent was recorded in
a Blockchain; (ii) privacy policies of providers appear in a
smart contract and permit users to join or leave the contract.
However checking compliance of consent rules was verified
manually. A combination of GDPR ontology and Blockchain
was proposed in [21] to ease real-time automated data
compliance. The approach ensured that data protection is
permitted, to ensure that data privacy policies are compliant
with GDPR rules. However, use of the approach within
cloud-based systems was not considered. A Blockchain-based
platform was designed in [22] that uses GDPR principles for
data provenance and transparency in a cloud environment.
The platform utilises user consent to ensure that only trusted
1https://github.com/google/cadvisor.
2https://aws.amazon.com/cloud- watch.
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cloud providers can use personal data. The activities of such
providers are recorded in a Blockchain. But, GDPR compli-
ance verification of cloud providers was not considered.
A forensic (evidence) data system using distributed cloud
resources was proposed in [23] for GDPR compliance check-
ing. The approach provided the availability and integrity
of the forensic data using Blockchain. The translation of
GDPR obligations (e.g. data protection and data transfer)
into smart contracts was not presented. Moreover, the ap-
proach did not provide automated verification of GDPR
obligations over the activities of providers. In [25], the
authors analyzed GDPR obligations that are necessary for
tracking operations of cloud providers on user data through a
Blockchain. However, a solution for checking the compliance
of such obligations in an automatic way was not provided.
The authors in [26] proposed a formal representation for
verification of GDPR obligations. Such obligations are en-
coded in smart contracts to provide an automatic approach
for data accountability. The approach, however, did not
consider the preference of users for verifying obligations (an
essential requirement to ensure scalability of the approach).
Furthermore, it also lacked a suitable container or virtual
machine-based environment.
In [13], a number of GDPR rules were translated into
smart contracts in order to automatically verify legal com-
pliance for operations executed by providers on data of
cloud customers. However, both data minimisation and data
protection obligations were not fully studied. In general,
although the foregoing approaches make use of GDPR and
Blockchain for improving data privacy, these do not consider
preferences of cloud customers for verifying GDPR obliga-
tions. Moreover, they cannot be directly utilised alongside
existing container technologies, e.g. Docker, Kubernetes. A
two phased framework supporting heterogeneous privacy for
personal data was proposed in [9]. The nodes hosting user
data utilised one-shot noise perturbation to reach heteroge-
neous privacy protection over various data servers. Moreover,
if data servers have fixed budgets, an efficient incentive
strategy was presented for optimising computation accu-
racy. However, verifying compliance of the framework with
privacy regulation was not studied. Moreover, a practical
implementation of the proposed framework using privacy-
aware solutions was not described.
III. An Online Pharmacy
A cloud-based pharmacy scenario (inspired by the Der-
maTran app. by dinCloud [12]) is used to motivate the im-
portance of GDPR compliance verification in a multi-cloud
system. Consider a user who visits a (cloud-hosted) online
pharmacy to place an order, make a payment and receive
a prescription to a home address. After order placement,
the pharmacy accesses various personal user data (such as
name, address, general practitioner (GP) diagnosis, the e-
prescription and bank account details), and extends the user
Electronic Health Record (EHR). The data is transferred to
an IaaS vendor (Cloud4U); the pharmacy uses Cloud4U to
host and operate its website and mobile app. The pharmacy’s
website and mobile app are embedded with “social plugins”
(a “Like” button and a “Share” button) from a leading
social network (Friendface). The Friendface API is designed
to automatically transmit users’ personal data (such as
IP address and location data) from the online pharmacy
to Friendface when a user visits the pharmacy’s website
or opens the app. Friendface uses this data to enrich a
patient’s profile that it has built over time (i.e. profiling),
which is valuable for its advertising business. Also, the
online pharmacy uses a real-time bidding (RTB) system of
a prominent online advertiser and intermediary (Froogle) to
sell advertising inventory space on its website and mobile
app., to derive another revenue stream. This system involves
extensive profiling and dissemination of personal data (such
as location, device properties, unique tracking ID and brows-
ing habits) to multiple companies (actors) in the ad tech
chain. The broadcast of personal data is made by Froogle’s
“Supply Side Platform” on behalf of the pharmacy, to solicit
bids from companies which may want to show an ad. to the
pharmacy’s user.
The pharmacy makes use of subcontracts for payment
and shipping service providers to handle the payment and
delivery of prescriptions. The payment service provider re-
ceives the patient’s name and bank account details from
the pharmacy, offering two alternatives, Western Union
and Paypal, to manage the payment process. The shipping
service provider, in turn, receives the patient’s name and
address details from the pharmacy, whereupon it packs
the order, sends the patient a reference number to track
the parcel, and delivers it. Each data flow in this cloud-
based ecosystem constitutes “personal data processing”, thus
warranting an assessment under the GDPR legislation. In
this regulatory framework, the online pharmacy is the data
controller, whereas all other cloud components act as data
processors. Determining the roles is a preliminary step, as
controllers and processors are subject to different obligations
under GDPR. For example, data protection rights can be
enforced against controllers only.
Based on the data flows and roles explained above, we
consider the following GDPR requirements:
• Transfer of personal data to a non-EU country. There
are two main ways of allowing international transfers of
personal data: on the basis of an adequacy decision by
the European Commission, or in lieu thereof, where the
controller or processor provides appropriate safeguards,
including enforceable rights and legal remedies for the
data subject [10], Art. 45. These safeguards can be
established by a legally binding and enforceable instru-
ment between public authorities (Binding Corporate
Rules); standard data protection clauses adopted by the
European Commission or a supervisory authority; codes
of conduct; certification mechanisms [10], Arts. 46 & 47.
• The principle of data protection requires that appro-
priate technical or organisational measures are imple-
mented when processing personal data to protect it
against accidental, unauthorised or unlawful access, use,
modification, disclosure, loss, destruction or damage
[10], Arts. 5(1)(f) and 32(1). Depending on the cir-
cumstances of each case, these measures may include
pseudonymising and encrypting personal data.
• Under the data minimisation principle, the personal
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Fig. 2: A business process model for online pharmacy
data being processed must be limited to what is nec-
essary [10], Art. 5(1)(c). Whether the data is necessary
will depend on the controller’s specified purpose for
collecting and using the personal data.
• For data storage obligation, Art. 5(e) of GDPR does not
allow actors to keep personal data longer than the time
required for data processing. Moreover, the encryption
of such data in the local storage of actors should be
guaranteed.
The proposed architecture is not limited to a specific case
study and can be applied to any cloud-based application.
IV. Architecture
We propose a multi-tier container-based monitoring archi-
tecture where operations related to the pharmacy scenario
are executed inside a container hosted over multiple cloud
service providers. Container-based virtualisation is popular
for reasons such as efficiency, ease of application deployment
and less overhead (compared to use of virtual machine). Also,
containers provide portability, where applications running
in containers can be migrated easily to different platforms.
Additionally, containers support monitoring at activity and
infrastructure levels making it more suitable for multi-cloud
system. At infrastructure level, containers should be com-
pliant with organisational rules and enable the functionality
for logging, checking, and remediation for these rules. At
activity level, white-box monitoring and tracking at run-time
are performed to trace internal systems vulnerabilities [7].
The proposed architecture consists of three functional lev-
els: 1) service provisioning, 2) monitoring, and 3) blockchain.
At the service provisioning level, whenever any customer
places an order on the online healthcare pharmacy web-
site/app, the data exchange between the customer and the
cloud provider takes place in a containerised environment.
The controller (Cloud4U) receives the request and dis-
tributes the service compositions to different processor cloud
providers (Western Union/Paypal or shipment provider).
Once the service is initiated, the monitoring system is ac-
tivated. The monitoring system contains two main compo-
nents, 1) GDPR-Agent, and 2) GDPR-Manager, which are
responsible for monitoring the data operations taking place
on the data in question throughout its lifetime and recording
them on the blockchain, to analyse potential GDPR viola-
tions using smart contracts.
A. Monitoring System
Cloud services generally use virtualised environments to
support multiple co-hosted services over the same cloud
infrastructure [8]. In cloud architectures, the monitoring
process is used to track any unwarranted or anomalous
events and store them for further verification (if required).
However, this is generally limited to performance monitor-
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(a) Registration and data collection. (b) Architecture.
Fig. 3: Monitoring System
ing, and there are limited automated mechanisms for GDPR
compliance verification. To overcome these limitation, we
propose a new GDPR monitoring agent. The GDPR-Agent
is a monitoring agent which is executed inside a container to
track data operations in the container-hosted online services.
The GDPR-Agent understands the underlying heterogeneity
of the containers deployed on a multi-tier cloud infrastruc-
ture. The main task of the GDPR-Agent involves the collec-
tion of data operation statistics (e.g. read, write, transfer,
profile) sending them to a collection engine (running inside
the GDPR Manager) that further sends them to a filtering
engine (query executor). The GDPR query is executed in
the filtering engine, whereas the GDPR-Manager runs on
the controller and administrates all the GDPR-Agents. The
monitoring architecture provide a fault tolerant mechanism
as it is quick and easy to replicate or clone an existing
container in case the manager or agent fails or compromised.
The working is described below.
1) GDPR-Agent: GDPR-Agent captures events based on
data operations being performed inside a container in a
cloud-hosted service. The GDPR-Agent (also known as
SmartAgent) receives data from various sub-agents (Read,
Write, Transfer, and Profile Agents).
The GDPR-Agent follows three operations – 1) Register():
a registration request is sent by the agent to the manager, 2)
SendData(): all events related to data operations are sent by
the agent to a collection engine periodically, and 3) SetCon-
figuration(): the agent sends its configuration information to
the manager, which can update configuration parameters of
the agent. Initially, the agent has to register with the GDPR-
Manager as per the process shown in Fig. 3a.
2) GDPR-Manager: The GDPR-Manager receives regis-
tration requests for all the GDPR-Agents (deployed inside
containers). Once the GDPR-Agent is registered with the
GDPR-Manager (step 1), the ADMIN starts the agent (step
2). The access key and endpoints are sent to the GDPR-
Agent by the manager. The GDPR-Agent sends its current
configuration to the manager (step 3). Thereafter, the agent
sends the monitored events to the collection engine (running
inside the GDPR Manager) through Manager Executor (step
4). The GDPR manager acts as a gateway to the other
internal systems of the proposed monitoring model. The
proposed manager-client architecture is based on the the
REST architecture style using the Restlet framework, due to
its powerful routing and filtering capabilities. The manager
is implemented as a restlet server with API functionalities
to allow users working as clients to connect with the overall
system. Users can only communicate with the manager that
controls the internal running processes, working as REST
clients to make requests to the manager to either read or
update their data stored in proposed ecosystem. The clients
are third parties that connect to manager to make request
either as individual users taking advantage of the designed
functionality for GDPR compliance or service providers.
Data operations (such as read, write, transfer, profile)
collected from the container are sent to the GDPR Manager,
where they are filtered to extract GDPR-relevant metrics.
The data received from the monitoring agent is exposed
to rule-based queries activated inside a filtering engine
through a query executor (step 5). These queries filter out
GDPR-specific metrics from the data collected by GDPR-
Agents (step 6). GDPR metrics are then transmitted to the
Ethereum Blockchain as container-logs using a push-based
mechanism (step 7). Precisely, the GDPR metrics submitted
to the Blockchain are: the anonymised version of provider
address, the operations (e.g., read, write etc.) executed on
personal data, the processed personal data items (e.g., name,
ID etc.), the collected personal data items from user, the
encryption status of operations, the location of provider, and
the retention period claimed by provider for storing personal
data. Note that the values of personal data items are not sent
to the Blockchain to ensure compliance with GDPR. A ver-
ification smart contract is then executed over the container-
log. If there are any GDPR violations, the GDPR-Manager
is updated (step 8). The manager updates the configurations
of the agents if required (dynamic configuration enables real-
time communication) (step 9). To communicate with the
Blockchain, the manager has to create an Ethereum account.
3) Monitoring Process: The monitoring process involves
different steps and programming operations as shown in Fig.
3b. These steps and related operations are described below.
• All GDPR-Agents are deployed in the container of
the user and cloud providers; the data operations are
recorded and sent to the collection engine.
• These events are added into different queues based on
their type or characteristic (e.g. read operations added
to a Read queue) via REST messages.
• A rule-based query engine filters out data containing
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GDPR metrics. This ensures that events that are not
needed to validate GDPR compliance do not get added
to the Blockchain, improving the efficiency of the veri-
fication process and reducing performance overhead.
• Finally, this container-log is added to the Blockchain
as a transaction. For this reason, the manager (which
already has an Ethereum account) creates a genesis (i.e.
first) transaction to which data, the timestamp, the
signature, and the public key of the controller cloud
provider are appended.
• This is followed by the creation of the genesis block (B)
with a unique ID; B: [BID]. The genesis transaction
(T1) is added to the block (B) after validation by the
trusted nodes. The user creates new transactions in the
same manner until the block achieves the maximum
block size (fixed) or threshold (variable).
• Finally, the block is added to the blockchain where
the smart contracts are deployed to verify the GDPR
obligations over the container-log.
B. GDPR-supported smart contracts
Smart contracts such as GDPR-priority and container-
log are proposed to record the information required for
checking GDPR compliance. The verification smart contract
is deployed to verify compliance with the aforementioned
obligations (data protection, data minimisation, data trans-
fer and data storage) by cloud providers. The activators of
GDPR-priority, container-log and verification are the data
subject (user), the smart manager, and the verifier. Note that
verifier is a trusted third party connected to the Blockchain
in charge of flagging GDPR violations.
C. Determining GDPR Compliance Preference
Verifying compliance with GDPR obligations (i.e. data
protection, data minimisation and data transfer) is a costly
process. Therefore, a data subject may not have the compu-
tational resources to verify GDPR compliance. This phase
enables data subjects to activate the GDPR-priority con-
tract in order to specify their preferences for verifying com-
pliance with obligations. The smart contract allows the data
subject to give a compliance score, identifying a “preference”
value for each obligation.
Definition 1. Let Σ be a set of GDPR obligations. A
compliance score is a function S : Σ 7→ [0, 1]. A compliance
score S(σ) = 1 indicates a requirement for full verification
of an obligation, where σ ∈ Σ; a score 0<S(σ)<1 represents
the partial verification of σ, and S(σ) = 0 shows that no
verification of σ is needed.
The contract stores such scores into a Blockchain to inform
the verifier about the data subject’s preferences concerning
the verification of GDPR obligations. For example, data pro-
tection is likely to be the greatest concern of the customers of
the online pharmacy depicted in Fig. 2, since their personal
data involve sensitive healthcare information.
D. Recording Data Processing Operations
This phase collects and sends a number of useful infor-
mation for verifying GDPR compliance by cloud providers.
The GDPR-manager of the container deploys the container-
log smart contract to send such information to a Blockchain.
The information includes (i) the anonymised provider’s ad-
dress (p), (ii) processed operations (Ap) on user data, (iii)
processed personal data items (Dp), (iv) collected personal
data items from user (Dcp), (v) encryption status of opera-
tions (Eap), (vi) the physical location of the provider (locp),
and (vii) the period of time claimed by provider for storing/
processing (tp) user data.
A permutation technique is used to anonymise information
kept in the Blockchain, such as provider address (IP). As
there is no specific GDPR compliance requirement for other
information, e.g. operation, encryption status etc. these be
deployed on any Blockchain environment (i.e., permissioned
or permissionless).
Thereafter, data operations are recorded by the GDPR-
Agent; the filtering engine is triggered to extract only events
that meet GDPR obligations defined by Σ.
Definition 2. Let E be a set of data operations and multi-
level statistics recorded by the GDPR-Agent. Data opera-
tions (EΣ) based on GDPR obligations Σ are filtered using
the function F : E 7→ {0, 1}, so that
EΣ =
{
1 : If E ∈ {read, write, transfer}
0 : Otherwise
E. Verifying GDPR Compliance
This phase verifies GDPR compliance of operations car-
ried out by cloud providers (data controllers/processors) on
personal data.
Definition 3. A preference for checking obligations is a
strict partial order relation, denoted by P = (Σ,RP), where
RP ⊆ Σ×Σ. If σ, σ′ ∈ Σ are two different GDPR obligations,
then σ RP σ′ is expressed as “σ′ is preferred rather than σ”.
Given a set of obligations selected by the data subject
and their verification time, the following definition gives the
verifier a priority for detecting violations in accordance with
the preferences of the data subject.
Definition 4. Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ be two GDPR obligations, S(σ)
and S(σ′) be the compliance scores determined by the data
subject. Checking the obligation σ′ is preferred over checking
σ (i.e. σ RP σ′) iff S(σ)<S(σ′).
Algorithm 1 Checking GDPR compliance
1: V ← ∅
2: case data protection
3: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃ ap ∈ Ap and Eap = ⊥}
4: case data minimisation
5: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | Dcp 6⊆ Dp}
6: case data transfer
7: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | ∃ p′ ∈P and (Eap =⊥ or locp′ /∈
BCR)}
8: case data storage
9: V ← V ∪ {p ∈ P | Eap = ⊥ or ts > tp}
10: return V
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The verifier deploys the verification contract to report
providers breaching the aforementioned obligations (i.e. data
protection, data minimisation and data transfer). The con-
tract involves a function presented in Alg. 1 to flag GDPR
violators that are extracted from a set V .
Data protection case: A provider p from the set of cloud
providers P , executing a set of operations Ap on user data,
is a violator if it has an operation ap that does not encrypt
personal data.
Data minimisation case: A provider p is reported as a
violator if the data Dp processed by p is a subset of the data
set Dcp requested by p. In other words, a provider collecting
data that is not used for processing is classified as a violator.
Data transfer case: A provider p is reported as a violator
if personal data is transferred to a provider p′ such that the
country of p′ (denoted by locp′) is not included in the BCR
set. This set includes the names of non-EU countries having
an adequacy decision with the European Commission, and
the names of enterprises which adhere to duly approved data
protection policies to move personal data internationally
over different jurisdictions [6]. The encryption of the data
transfer operation is also checked through the contract.
Data storage case: A provider p is a violator if the
retention period (ts) for keeping data is longer than the one
(tp) claimed for data processing by a provider (Art. 5(e)).
Also, any data storage is subject to encryption of personal
data required by GDPR. The contract checks both condi-
tions Eap = > & ts ≤ tp, where ap is write operation. The
verification contract checks obligations in a decreasing order
based on compliance scores provided by a data subject.
V. Experimental Setup and Validation Results
In [4], we formally verified a cloud-based order system via
Uppaal in accordance with a GDPR obligations under which
processing activities violating the obligations were detected
at design time. However, the implementation of such verifica-
tion through practical technologies/ tools (e.g., Blockchain
and container) was not discussed. In this work evaluation
is separated into two sections: section V-A evaluates the
monitoring system and section V-B assesses transaction
costs associated with the blockchain model.
A. Validation of Monitoring System
The monitoring system is implemented in Java using a
container-based environment running on a host operating
system. The host device is an M1 MacBook Air, 2020
running MacOS BigSur v11.3.1 OS with 8 core CPU (4
performance and 4 efficiency cores) with 8GB memory.
For test purposes, a private blockchain network is set up
using Ganache as: 1) Ganache is able to quickly start a
local blockchain network for testing. 2) Ganache provides
a number of test blockchain accounts (default of 10), pre-
configured with 100 ethers each. This aligns with require-
ments of our test scenarios which involve a high number of
requests and hence more ether consumption. GDPR agents
are implemented using the SIGAR and RESTLet libraries
to ensure compatibility with multiple cloud providers. The
monitoring system uses SIGAR to collect various system
overheads, namely CPU usage, memory usage, latency, and
throughput. The RESTLet Framework includes a unified
client and server API that enables developers to build secure
and scalable RESTful services. The manager is implemented
as a RESTLet server, and users implemented as REST
clients.
The overheads are measured to validate the efficacy of
the proposed monitoring system with respect to downtime.
The metrics (delay, CPU usage, and memory usage) are
collected using a Docker-based container environment that
starts running when the manager process is started. This
helps to separate the metrics collection from other run-
ning manager processes, thereby preventing these process
from influencing the response times for client requests and
other processes. Metrics are collected every second and the
information is stored in the sys overheads table. Given
the online pharmacy from Fig. 2, three different workload
scenarios or Service Packages (SP) are used, as described
below. These workloads are representative of actual services
that can be deployed to verify GDPR compliance.
• Service Package 1 (SP1) contains two actors
(Blockchain peer nodes) with 9 operations executed on
user personal data.
• Service Package 2 (SP2) involves four actors with 16
operations carried out on personal data.
• Service Package 3 (SP3) has six actors with 23 opera-
tions executed on user data.
The aim of such packages is showing the scalability of our
approach. Overhead information is collected for each of the
SPs, as indicated in the following subsections.
1) CPU usage: The variation in CPU usage for recording
logs for data operations is depicted in Fig. 4 – with events
recorded every second. For SP1, CPU usage lies between
5%–20%, increasing with 2 instances to 24.5%. For SP2, the
variation of CPU usage can be inferred in 3 parts, a) for
first 60 instances it ranges between 8%–17%, b) for instances
between 60–105, it ranges between 18%–40%, and c) for all
instances from 105 onward till 210, the ranges is again similar
to part 1, i.e., 8%–17%. We observe that CPU usage for some
instances can increase by up to 30%. While analysing SP3,
it is observed that CPU usage remains between 8%–17%
throughout with two exceptions, a) from instance 90–130 the
range lies between 15%–35% with one instance increasing by
up to 40%, b) the last 10 instances also shows an increase
in CPU between 10%–22%. It can be inferred from the
above results that variation in CPU usage is constrained to
a limited range, and only in restricted cases it shows growth
due to larger size of recorded data operations. The average
CPU usage for these cases, a) SP1 = 11.96%, b) 11.67%, and
c) 11.53%. Although the average CPU usage is comparable,
fewer operations are logged for SP1 compared to the other
SPs. Hence, CPU usage is comparatively higher than the
other two cases if we consider the number of operations
logged for each SP.
2) Memory usage: The variation in memory usage during
the monitoring process is illustrated in Fig. 5. In SP1, the
highest memory usage reaches just above 3420MB, whereas
for SP2 and SP3 it is 3500MB and 3550MB respectively.
It can be inferred that peak memory usage for all three SPs
are not very different (between 3420MB–3350MB), primarily
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Fig. 4: Variations in the CPU usage for a) SP1, b) SP2, and c) SP3
Fig. 5: Variations in memory usage for a) SP1, b) SP2, and c) SP3
Fig. 6: Variations in a) Latency, and b) Throughput
affected by the considered data operations. It is further sup-
ported by the average memory usage. The average memory
usage for these cases, a) SP1=3316MB, b) SP2=3404MB,
and c) SP3=3434MB. Memory usage for SP1 is lower than
the other two cases because the number of operations logged
are less in contrast to the other SPs.
3) Average Latency: The variation in latency during the
monitoring process is illustrated in Fig. 6a. Latency is
measured as the time difference (in ms) between submission
and completion of a blockchain logging transaction. We
have evaluated the latency for all three service packages
(increasing number of actors and operations) with respect
to an increase in the number of requests. For simplicity,
we have plotted the average latency at each instance with
respect to an increase in the number of requests. For a test
set of 13K requests, the latency for log submission for all
three service packages was found to be ≈58ms, ≈63ms and
≈52ms, respectively. Initially, the average latency is higher
as it takes some time to adjust to the system setting. But,
as it reaches 450 requests, the average latency stabilizes
and remains within the range of ≈50-60 ms. But, after 12K
requests, there is an abrupt change in latency for SP2 but
for all other service packages it remained stable.
4) Average Throughput: It is calculated by finding the
start and end time for the processing of a set of requests
sent to the monitoring framework and then dividing the
number of requests by the time interval. We have evaluated
the throughput for all three service packages with an increase
in the number of requests. Here also, for simplicity, we have
plotted the average average at each instance with respect
to an increase in the number of requests. For 13K requests,
the average throughput for all three service packages was
found to be 8.7tps, 7.7tps and 9.6tps, respectively. After 12K
requests, there was an abrupt change in throughput for SP1
and SP2 but it was stable for SP3.
5) Scalability: The scalability of the monitoring tool was
assessed by increasing the number of actors and operations
(different for each service package) as well as the number
of requests (increased to 13K requests). The results consider
how throughput and latency are affected – illustrated in Fig.
6. The results are system dependant and the specifications
for the host device used to carry out benchmarking are as
given at the start of this section.
In Fig. 6a, the measured average latency for all three
service packages is maintained at ≈50-60ms, indicating that
increasing the number of monitoring processes (including
actors and operations) does not affect the speed at which
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records are logged in the blockchain. The reason for this
behaviour is due to an absence of concurrency in blockchain
transactions (for a given account due to the nonce), as such,
transactions are processed sequentially. Multiple logs can be
generated via separate accounts simultaneously. However,
we witness a sudden change in latency for SP2 after 12K
requests in contrast to the others.
The variation in throughput for the various test scenarios
is illustrated in Fig. 6b. The throughput increases as number
of requests increase for all three service packages. The rate
of increase starts to taper off as the saturation point of this
tool is being reached. When the number of requests reach
450, the average throughput reaches a value of ≈8.3 for
SP1, ≈8.2 for SP2, and ≈8 for SP3. These test results show
that this monitoring tool handles an increasing number of
requests without degradation in the quality of service for
each service package. After this, the throughput becomes
stable (with no much variation), as it was experimented till
the number of request reach 12K. After this, there is an
observable degradation in the value of throughput.
The lines in the plot overlap at some instances due to the
average and randomness of the experiments.
B. Validation of Smart Contracts
After the data (or event) operations are collected and
logged in the Blockchain using the proposed monitoring
system, the smart contracts are executed in the Blockchain
to verify the GDPR compliance. For this reason. the ex-
periments provided in this section investigates the transac-
tions’ costs required to deploy and run our proposed smart
contracts in Blockchain networks. A prototype has been
developed via Ropsten [15], which is a public Blockchain
test network. The prototype provides the number of oper-
ations needed when executing transactions, represented as
the amount of consumed gas when executing transactions
and the time the mining process takes. Gas is a unit in wei
that measures the amount of computational effort needed
for executing operations in smart contracts. In other words,
it is an internal currency in Ethereum to pay for transaction
fees. Gas is paid in ether – a cryptocurrency in Ethereum
permitting smart contracts to be executed. Though the
amount of gas consumed for running a transaction is high, its
translation to ether unit is low. For example, if the consumed
gas of a transaction is 10000 wei, the transaction fee is
around 0.0002 ether.
In this experiment, our proposed smart contracts were
implemented on Ethereum [14] using Solidity. Our ap-
proach creates smart contracts with a minimum gas con-
sumption for each function. The contracts were compiled
by Remix, a browser-based compiler for Solidity using an
Ethereum Virtual Machine. The smart contracts GDPR-
priority, container-log and verification were executed in the
Ropsten network. The amount of gas consumed for deploying
a contract was 371045 wei for GDPR-priority, 1146256 wei
for container-log and 1642780 wei for Verification.
1) Transaction costs: This evaluation calculates the
amount of gas consumed in the execution of our proposed
smart contracts. It assumes that we have three SPs for the
pharmacy scenario represented in Sect. III. The proposed
TABLE II: The transaction costs of service packages
SP1 SP2 SP3
Number of actors 2 4 6
Number of operations 9 16 23
Total container-log (wei) 1562478 2782774 3882652
Data protection (wei) 297628 743436 1401864
Data minimisation (wei) 905648 1582621 2305178
Data transfer (wei) 323501 1112821 1803427
Data storage (wei) 304562 762341 1522370
smart contracts were deployed in the Ropsten test network
and were executed five times to calculate the average results.
We investigated the average cost for recording information
via the container-log contract and the average costs for
verifying compliance with the data protection, data min-
imisation, data transfer and data storage obligations. Ta-
ble II shows the experimental results, indicating that when
the number of operations/ actors increases, the amount of
gas consumption increases sharply. In this experiment, the
amount of gas used for recording user preference via the
GDPR-priority contract was 83791 wei.
TABLE III: Verification costs and average mining time
SP1 SP2 SP3
Gas price (gwei) 45 57 70
Data protection ($) 3.12 9.70 23.19
Data minimisation ($) 9.49 20.65 38.13
Data transfer ($) 3.40 14.52 29.83
Data storage ($) 3.31 10.15 24.02
Mining time (seconds) 257 115 26
2) Verification cost vs mining time: This evaluation mea-
sures compliance verification for the data protection, data
minimization, data transfer and data storage obligations
under different gas prices. It assumes that we have three
SPs, being the same as those described in Sect. V-A. The
gas price units requested by user are 45, 57 and 70 gwei
for running transactions of SP1, SP2 and SP3 respectively.
Our proposed smart contracts were executed five times in
Ropsten to calculate average results. As seen in Table III, the
verification costs are expressed in US dollars (USD), and the
average time taken for mining such transactions is calculated
in seconds. Given a SP, data protection has the minimum
verification cost, as it only considers the encryption status
of operations and hence its complexity is lesser than verifi-
cation of other obligations. In contrast, the most expensive
verification cost is allocated to data minimisation, since it
requires checking operations and also examines the types of
personal data processed by these operations. The evaluation
also shows that when the rate of gas price unit increases,
there is a considerable decrease in the average mining time.
3) Evaluation of violation detection rate: This evaluation
investigates the relationship between the amount of money
paid by a user for verifying GDPR obligations and the
average rate of successful violation detection.3 It assumes
that the aforementioned SPs are offered to the user (patient
ordering medication in the pharmacy scenario). We used
3A verification fee shows the affordable cost that can be paid by user
for the obligations’ verification.
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Fig. 7: Transaction fee vs Violation detection rate
Ropsten for executing the verification contract and the gas
price is 1 gwei. There is a GDPR violation in a SP selected
by the user for each operation. The violation is randomly
selected from amongst the aforementioned obligations. The
contract was executed ten times to calculate the average
detection rate. Figure 7 illustrates the results of the exper-
iment, where the x-axis shows the fee paid by the user for
verifying compliance with obligations, and the y-axis shows
the number of successfully detected violations. As can be
seen, for a given price, SP3 involving the highest number of
operations, has the lowest likelihood of violation detection.
For instance, GDPR compliance cannot be detected when a
user selects SP3 and their budget is limited to USD $0.3.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presented the design of a container-based
monitoring and auditing architecture for improving data
privacy in cloud ecosystems. The architecture makes use of a
Blockchain network and supports GDPR obligations in the
tracking of activities executed by cloud providers on user
data. By proposing the GDPR-priority, container-log and
verification smart contracts, the system described in this
work can be used to verify compliance with three GDPR
obligations by cloud providers, namely data protection, data
minimisation, data transfer and data storage. The GDPR-
priority contract allows a user to provide a preference for
verifying compliance with an obligation. The container-log
contract allows the GDPR-manager to send information
relevant to the aforementioned obligations to a Blockchain.
The verification contract enables a verifier to check com-
pliance with obligations based on preferences determined
by the user. These smart contracts were deployed in the
Ropsten test network, and evaluation results show that as
the number of operations in a composite service grows, the
verification cost increases significantly. The implementation
of our proposed smart contracts in Blockchain test network
enabled us to estimate the potential cost of verification for
GDPR compliance. The evaluation of transaction costs in
the online pharmacy service packages, with different scales
of processing activities, enabled a user to understand how
changes in operations/ actors affect the cost of GDPR
verification. Although a single scenario has been used in this
work, our container-based architecture and proposed smart
contracts can be generalised to other scenarios.
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